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CHAPTER 8
The Compass of Beauty: A Search 
for the Middle
Lars Spuybroek 
A very specifi c problem occurs at the heart of ontology: how can things 
exist externally, with others, while being made up of parts, and thus 
existing internally? Or, to phrase it a bit more pointedly, in Kantian 
terms: how can things have synthetic relations between the whole 
and the world while being constituted analytically, through relations 
between the whole and its parts? How can these two realms be part of 
one continuum of existence? No variety of materialism has been able 
to solve this problem. In its traditional form, determinism, either God 
or consciousness is needed to direct the connecting vector of necessity; 
and its later form, emergence, leaves a gap between the interacting parts 
and the emerged whole happily interacting with other wholes. Even in 
the nineteenth century, Darwin struggled with the idea that variation 
acted as the sole positive force in nature, ‘endlessly’ adding ‘forms most 
beautiful’,1 with natural selection doomed merely to act as a negative 
force, selecting out some of those variants as ugly misfi ts. Indeed, fi tness 
in itself contributes nothing to the concept of variation, since it is not 
the environment that tells parts how to come together. Apparently, parts 
only interact with parts and wholes with wholes, and while material-
ist ontologies succeed very well in explaining the intensive parts stage 
and the environmental wholes stage, they completely fail to connect the 
two. The two physical sides of the equation are separated by a yawning 
metaphysical gap, impossible for them to bridge, at least physically. A 
brief refl ection on the vertical nature of the term ‘emergence’, however, 
should make us realise that the fl at, blind world of material interac-
tions cannot exist without transcendence. Scientists and philosophers 
of science speak of emergence as if it is the reverse of classic top-down 
imposition, and it is, but merely in directionality, certainly not conceptu-
ally: it inhabits the same vertical axis, covers the same vertical distance 
and thrives on the same dualisms. Without question, admitting to the 
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metaphysical nature of emergence would deeply affect all notions of 
physicality, which is why all materialists shy away from it. Therefore, 
we should fi nd a way to accept transcendence and, instead of making it 
part of external agency, make it part of things themselves.
To do so, we would fi rst need to put enough mind into matter to 
allow the parts to see beyond their own horizon. We should come to 
understand their efforts to conform as an actual striving for a whole, 
which amounts not to a general teleology, like the abovementioned 
necessity, but rather to a local teleology, or what we might call a local 
transcendence. Then, inversely, we should allow wholes to connect to 
parts of other wholes, turning that local transcendence into a zone of 
attraction. My claim is that only beauty makes this reversal possible. 
It makes the parts exceed the whole, rather than the whole exceed-
ing the parts, as the doctrine of emergence prescribes. When you say 
someone has beautiful eyes, you do not expect the other to take out 
an eye and hand it over, as Baudrillard once joked. The parts of other 
people or things that we like – somebody’s red hair, the shining of gold, 
the curves of the hills, the light fl ickering on the river – we do not like 
as such, but as parts of a whole, as radiating from that whole.2 And 
at that point, the part has transcended its role as a part. The red hair 
might insulate the scalp from the cold, but our liking has no interest 
whatsoever in that physiological function. Natural selection will never 
be able to explain why redness came about in the way that emergence 
can, but emergence will never be able to explain why redness is liked – 
they pass each other like ships in the night. Beauty allows parts to be 
visible and available to other wholes without removing them from their 
relationship with neighbouring parts. Philosophically speaking, this is 
unheard of: no other power is capable of jumping over the proverbial 
gap between the two realms. Beauty – and it is no accident that Darwin 
used the word – solves that impossible equation and manages to put the 
analytic and the synthetic in the same realm of existence, or at least to 
fi nd a point where they intersect or align, or even pivot when we think 
of it as a reversal: a point that is necessarily ontological. Things can-
not be without being beautiful; or, to put it somewhat more neutrally, 
things cannot be without making a claim on their environment, no mat-
ter what that claim is. Beauty is like the narrow middle of an hourglass, 
with all parts gathering into a single point on the convergent side and 
spilling out on the other, divergent side, as if radiating from that point. 
Our question in the next twenty or so pages should then be: How does 
beauty construct this intersection between the two states? 
Traditionally, this point has been termed a ‘middle’, a middle that 
has taken on so many forms that it may be useful to roughly sketch 
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its historical transformations before we enter into a more detailed dis-
cussion. A good place to start would be Apollo’s call for moderation, 
which later developed into Aristotle’s virtuous golden mean, and in 
between, Plato’s monopolar universe where beauty occupied the abso-
lute centre of everything. This concept raises some questions right 
away: does it mean that beauty is itself the middle – like a heart or an 
origin – or that it must exist between pre-existing extremes that have 
not yet been mentioned? Plato was rather ambiguous on the matter, 
since in his philosophy beauty plays the role of the good yet is as often 
described by him in terms of the terrifying, such as a bolt of lightning 
that strikes from the sky. Apparently, his singular pole secretly leads 
a double existence. A few centuries after Plato, lightning became the 
model Longinus used to postulate his notion of the sublime in the Peri 
Hypsous: the claim of things not to a middle position but to the greatest 
and the highest. For more than a millennium, the universe of aesthet-
ics has remained in this bipolar state, oscillating between beauty and 
the sublime, though occasionally other forms are admitted – the novel, 
the strange, the comic, the tragic – mostly in the form of subcategories. 
The fi rst notion of beauty and the sublime being connected by a continu-
ous scale of gradual transformations – as if by a slider, so to speak – may 
have come with the invention of the picturesque, famously described 
by Uvedale Price as ‘a station in between beauty and sublimity’. As 
is well known, Kant carefully follows the English aestheticians in their 
theories, while adding more positions to the slider and shifting beauty 
slightly towards the middle by introducing the pretty (Hübsch) at one 
extreme and the sublime at the other, with the magnifi cent and the ter-
rifying (Schreckhaft-Erhabene) in between. Dilthey, the German neo-
Kantian philosopher, in turn managed to add the ugly to the line-up 
as well, and was the fi rst to call the system a spectrum. Following this 
hint on colour, it was Max Dessoir who then constructed a diagram of 
aesthetics in the form of a colour wheel, a spoked circle, fi nally bend-
ing the linear spectrum into a curved systemacy. At that point, it was 
not clear to Dessoir how the circle in fact reintroduced the concept of a 
middle on a new level: as a centre, not as the midpoint on a line. At last, 
in the 1970s, the American process philosopher Charles Hartshorne, by 
then a septuagenarian (though with another thirty years ahead of him), 
mixed Dessoir’s model with Whitehead’s ideas on beauty to form a very 
precise biaxial model while placing beauty back at the centre, creating a 
middle between two dimensions, between two sliders – one analytical, 
indexing the relations between parts, and the other synthetic, indexing 
relations between wholes. At that point almost 2,500 years had passed 
since Plato had expressed his ideas on beauty.
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Describing the course of beauty through history, even in such a sketchy 
fashion, immediately challenges a facile concept of the middle, demand-
ing a far more rigorous defi nition that will allow us to understand the 
variations and how these might have evolved from one another. In some 
of these historic phases, the term ‘middle’ referred to moderation and 
mediation; sometimes it indicated a mean; and sometimes it was used in 
the sense of an equation. However, in this apparently confusing lineage 
we discern a clear increase in dimensionality, going from Plato’s univer-
sal centre point to an ever-widening linear scale, then transforming into 
a circular surface defi ned by a centre and a circumference. Naturally, 
during each of these phases, questions arise. For instance, looking at its 
linear phase, should we view the middle as a pivot between two ends of 
a scale? That would mean the middle was fi xed and the extremes were 
variable. Or should we view the poles as fi xed, with a sliding midpoint 
between them, which things could seek out through variation? The fi rst 
would probably best be called an equation, the second a mediation. 
Strangely enough, the continuous blurring of concepts itself seems to 
have increased the dimensionality of the system. The single point trans-
forms into a single line with two poles, and that single line into two lines 
(now with four poles), each stage defi ned by its own notion of a middle, 
be it a centre, a form of mediation or an equation. We should not only 
be questioning what exactly constitutes a middle but also asking our-
selves what it is whose middle we are speaking of, since throughout 
its history beauty has been surrounded by ever more diverse aesthetic 
values. Does this mean beauty is positioned in a world that consists of 
states that are not beautiful? Yes, in a way. And when such states are not 
beautiful, are they still part of that pivoting function, that ontological 
function that we have assigned to beauty? Yes, probably. And if so, does 
that mean those other states are related to beauty in a way in which they 
are not related to each other? Yes, it certainly would.
At the moment when we start to view beauty as fundamental to 
existence, we are able to understand the variable powers of the analytic 
and the synthetic as they merge in entities, spawning things that are 
not only beautiful but, just as often, ugly, magnifi cent, cute or funny, if 
not hilarious or ridiculous, or even quirky and quaint, cool, boring or 
weird, melodramatic and vulgar, or again totally common and ordinary, 
not forgetting of course horrifi c and terrifying, or utterly gruesome and 
disgusting – and many, many more things. Such ontological abundance 
means in the fi rst place that all things are positive: all things act in the 
arena of presence, an arena deprived of any backstage area, basement, 
or curtains to hide behind. Things can be withdrawn, autistic or melan-
cholic, but they are so in the light of day. In the second place, it means 
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all positive things are equations of the analytic and the synthetic, both 
axes producing positive values somewhere between zero and a maxi-
mum. And, since the synthetic deals with the confi guration of presence 
– all wholes interacting with one another at a certain moment – it also 
means, in the third place, that such a snapshot fi lls the complete mosaic 
of beauty in all its variations. It forms a universe where every fragrant 
fl ower, every smile on a face, every bomb attack, every nightmare, every 
tumour and every silly joke seems to be part of a massive kaleidoscopic 
image in which the heaviest stone monument and the tiniest refl ection, 
a fl ash of red hair and a plane crash, the most fragile dragonfl y and 
the darkest forest all mosaically fi t together at every instant, constantly 
aggregating into enormous multicoloured crystals, which immediately 
collapse to be replaced with new generations; and this kaleidoscopic 
image is beyond what anyone of us would call order, or chaos for that 
matter, passing a threshold at which sheer contingency and pure perfec-
tion are wholly interchangeable.
Let us now take our little sketch and, step by step, add more detail.
Spectrum and Circle
The ancient, colossal statue of Apollo on his island of birth, Delos, 
carried in one hand his famous bow and in the other a second, much 
smaller statue of the Three Graces, mounted on a disk. Though a 
frequent method of depicting Apollo’s dual nature in ancient Greece, 
this iconography is no longer commonly known, since most statues 
have not survived intact and only a handful of engravings on ancient 
coins and descriptions in ancient manuscripts remain. Apollo’s better-
known attributes, the bow and the lyre, fulfi lled similar functions, 
though more ambivalently, since in ancient Greece the two were 
clearly connected. For example, Heraclitus used the bow and the lyre 
to illustrate his celebrated doctrine on the harmony of opposites,3 
later developed into concordia discors, the maxim of the Renaissance. 
Aside from the formal resemblance between bow and lyre, there is 
the conceptual one: the string of a bow can ‘sing sweetly’, as Homer 
wrote,4 and the music of the lyre can strike at our hearts with the 
sharpness of an arrow. The classical philologist Karl Kerényi argued 
that Apollo could not be adequately characterised by the custom-
ary loftiness ascribed to him but combined chthonic darkness and 
Olympian clarity in one divinity.5 In a similar vein, the classicist Mar-
cel Detienne speaks of Apollo’s ‘profound ambivalence’, especially 
because he had more killings to his name than any other god.6 Apollo 
was capable of ‘striking from afar’ (hekebolos) with his arrows as 
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well as enchanting and persuading with his music or his tongue. In 
other words, Apollo’s dual nature is not so much a question of choice, 
of either/or, but of a combination, a doubling of the dimensions in 
which each of his actions takes place. 
In light of this, we should be quick to distance ourselves from the depic-
tion of Apollo as the tedious, teetotal, proto-Christian anti-Dionysus that 
the early Nietzsche made of him in The Birth of Tragedy. The young 
philosopher crudely located Dionysus at one end of the spectrum and 
Apollo on the other, as if the fi rst were interested only in excess and the 
second merely in harmony. Apollo’s temple in Delphi was in fact shared 
with the Dionysus cult. In winter the temple was used to dedicate services 
to Dionysus, but the rest of the year the priestess – the Pythia – was in 
regular but frenzied communication with Apollo through epiphanies that 
were at least as ecstatic as those of the god of wine and spirits. Certainly, 
Apollo’s maxim – mēden ágan (‘nothing in excess’), inscribed above the 
entrance to the temple in Delphi – is a call for moderation, but we have to 
keep in mind that moderation is always one of excess. Apollo’s call is not 
one for abstinence: he does not propose to counter excess with asceticism 
or passivity; that would lead absolutely nowhere. We should understand 
that excess and moderation are not of the same order and that we cannot 
just stop halfway towards excess. We cannot simply interrupt ourselves, 
nor can we divide ourselves in two, into a rational, moderating mind 
and a body thirsty for excess, since the mind would quickly concede 
during any ecstatic act. No, it would be much better to imagine excess 
and measure as two forces coming from different directions. And those 
two forces need to be mediated: they can only be resolved through one 
act. In this case, a single act does not subsist in doing one thing until the 
point of exhaustion. The act needs to follow a curved trajectory: to start 
in one direction and come to a close in another. A single act – that is, an 
act of beauty – does two things simultaneously. First it aims for excess, 
then it aims for moderation, or, to use the metaphor of Apollo’s bow, it 
shoots the arrow upward while aiming forward. With this model, we are 
shifting the notion of mediation towards that of mathematical equation: 
between the horizontal axis of measure and the vertical axis of excess, 
Apollo draws a curved function, equating the infl uence of both, starting 
with more verticality and ending with horizontality. 
Doing something well, or, as Aristotle would say, doing something 
virtuously, then becomes a form of navigation, in which we do not 
move in one direction but steer between multiple directions. This, of 
course, we recognise from Plato’s analogy of the charioteer in the Pha-
edrus, where the soul is represented by a chariot pulled by two winged 
horses, one black and the other white. Plato’s analogies – the cave, the 
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ladder of love, the charioteer – are not just metaphors, as often indi-
cated, but closer to mathematical functions, and it is no accident that 
in many translations they are clarifi ed with concise diagrams. In fact, it 
would not be wholly off the mark to call Plato the fi rst analytic philoso-
pher, since those analogies could easily be written out in mathemati-
cal symbols (his notion of truth was deeply infl uenced by Pythagorean 
equations). Anyway, the brilliance of the analogy of the charioteer lies 
in the fact that the vector of an act can be separated into two forces, 
or, more precisely, two sets of variables, since each horse can exert any-
thing between minimum and maximum force. And since the horses are 
winged, the chariot can go up, down, left or right. It is quite clear from 
Plato’s descriptions in the Phaedrus that the steering cannot be reduced 
to the mere imposing of one’s will on both horses – if that were the case, 
the soul would not need the horses to strive. On the contrary, Plato 
describes a myriad of behaviours: zigzagging through the sky, falling 
back to earth, and steering one’s way up to the sphere of immortal-
ity to become part of the ever-recurring cycles of the heavenly bodies. 
The soul, as Plato sees it, is not the charioteer steering the body as a 
homunculus but the single movement between two directions. Slightly 
earlier, when writing the Symposium, he used the term metaxu for this 
in-between, a term which becomes especially important in the dialogue 
between Diotima – ‘a woman from Mantinea’ – and Socrates, as she 
teaches him about the nature of love as it relates to beauty. 
‘Love is of beautiful things’,7 she says, which means not yet possess-
ing beautiful things but being in a state between not having and having 
beauty, a state that cannot be described as a static betweenness but as 
a being-under-way, a state of striving and navigating. In this sense, all 
acts are acts of love because they strive for beauty, and such acts coor-
dinate themselves between two feelings: one of sheer happiness8 and 
one of pure fear, a fear of falling in which one moves in the opposite 
direction along the vertical axis of transcendence towards doom and 
failure. This double movement of love is taken up again in the Phaedrus 
after the analogy of the charioteer, when he arrives at the moment of 
possession, falling in love with a beautiful boy whose face strikes him 
like ‘a bolt of lightning’;9 it is a love that makes the soul ‘begin to grow 
wings’.10 And, as often in Plato, it presents a dual argument that fl oats 
between stillness – we should bear in mind that the charioteer actually 
stands still in his chariot – and movement, between wisdom and igno-
rance, but here especially between overpowering and empowering. We 
are ‘captured by beauty’ while ‘a fear comes over us’,11 a power that 
comforts us as much as it terrifi es us, and one that he as often associates 
with a bolt of lightning as with the brilliance of the sun. 
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In Plato, we are not only introduced to this vast cosmic system of 
heavenly verticality and earthly horizontality but also to this confusion 
of beauty-as-the-highest and beauty-as-the-middle. And the confusion 
sometimes tends to take hold of the pages and spread like a stain. For 
example, Plato is adamant about the ontological nature of beauty when 
he states that beauty is literally ‘seeing reality’;12 then again, he is con-
vinced that the realm of beauty, a ‘place beyond heaven’, is ‘a place 
without colours, without forms, and without solidity’.13 Obviously, 
such a contradiction at the core of his philosophy poses a colossal prob-
lem. How can we see what is invisible? Let us fi rst note that the confu-
sion was not merely his own: it preceded him in different forms, and it 
persisted all the way through Hegel’s ‘sinnliche Idee’14 and Paul Klee’s 
‘art renders the invisible visible’, to cite just two examples. Also, we 
should realise that the problem is more of a geometrical, dimensional 
nature than a conceptual or philosophical one. Without a doubt, Plato 
put all the elements in place: the vertical, the horizontal, linearity, cir-
cularity, the middle, the circumference – though the whole idea remains 
a tangle almost too discouraging to unravel. As stated, it would take 
thinkers a couple of thousand years to see that what looked like a pole 
was actually a line, and that what looked like a line was actually an 
axis, and what looked like one axis with two poles was actually two 
axes, and that those two axes were equated by a circle, and that the 
circle was a single line that had one pole in the middle. After a few mil-
lennia of aesthetic development had traced beauty back in the centre, 
we can conclude that Plato had been right all along.
The notion of beauty-as-the-highest is one we fi nd in many varia-
tions, of course, especially under the Neoplatonic philosophers, such as 
Pseudo-Dionysius, Plotinus and Saint Augustine, who without exception 
were theologians. Nietzsche derisively called Christianity ‘Platonism 
for the people’,15 which might not be completely accurate, except for 
the implicit argument that Christians took advantage of Plato’s confu-
sion. The image of God embodies fear as much as it does love, and this 
confusion goes back much further than the Christian interpretation of 
Platonism. For instance, Zeus was associated with lightning, thunder 
and weather in general,16 that is, with what we would call the sublime, 
while his son Apollo was associated with the sun and the radiance of 
the beautiful. (I would not be the fi rst to state that Christianity copied 
that model from the ancient Greeks. In fact, very early depictions of 
Jesus show him as beardless as Apollo, and with his head surrounded by 
the same radiant halo.) But let us not dwell too long on the mythologi-
cal origins of Western theology. Since our interest goes out to beauty 
and navigation, we should focus on its dimensional structure and try 
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to unravel the difference between beauty-as-the-highest and beauty-as-
the-middle. Longinus, who in the fi rst century ad wrote Peri Hypsous 
– literally meaning ‘On the High’, though generally translated as On the 
Sublime – makes extensive use of the thunder-and-lightning model to 
describe the epiphanic character of sublimity. Throughout the treatise, it 
is clear that Longinus aligns the sublime with greatness – a word he uses 
over and over – as well as with the power of lightning that strikes from 
above, moving the subject ‘out of himself’ (ekstasis) and overpowering 
him with an ‘irresistible force’. Let us disregard the fact that Longinus’ 
argument lies in the realm of rhetoric, or art in general, since it makes no 
difference for the positioning of the sublime on the vertical axis whether 
we encounter it in words, in imagery, through standing in front of actual 
mountains, or through sitting at home contemplating the endlessness of 
the universe – the diversity of these examples is telling enough. Beauty, 
sublimity, ugliness, nobility – without exception, these aesthetic values 
are to be found in the realm of the natural as well as the artifi cial; there-
fore, no theory relying on the formal properties of these realms will 
be able to suffi ciently defi ne such values. What is remarkable is that 
what at fi rst seem to be mere metaphors are in fact exact phenomeno-
logical descriptions of aesthetic feelings; and what is even more remark-
able is that their precision does not lead to a phenomenology but to an 
ontological machinery of a perplexing geometrical exactitude. How else 
would it be possible for things to be called ‘high’ or ‘great’?
After Longinus was translated into French by Boileau in 1674, his 
book quickly landed in the hands of the English aestheticians, and it 
was they who developed the sublime and prepared it for the German 
idealists, who turned the high into the deep, fi rst as Kant’s Abgrund, 
then as Schelling’s Ungrund. John Dennis, Joseph Addison, the Earl of 
Shaftesbury, Edmund Burke: over a period of a hundred years, Eng-
lish aesthetic philosophers took the sublime and refi ned it with notions 
such as that of enthusiastic terror, which they distinguished from com-
mon terror (a fear mixed with a feeling of admiration), and placed it in 
the realm of the unlimited, the majestic and the stupendous, all direct 
descendants of Plato’s black horse, the horse of divine madness, or as 
the ancient Greeks called it, enthousiasmos. But what in Plato was still 
an overlapping of two forms of beauty, the highest and the middle, 
now became more clearly distinguished: beauty was a smooth world of 
what Francis Hutcheson famously called ‘uniformity amidst variety’,17 
while the sublime was a world of the unlimited and the unbound, of 
either enormous size (like mountains), indefi nite size (like weather and 
storms), or infi nite size (like endlessness itself). Even without elaborat-
ing on the issue, it is immediately clear how the variety of terminology 
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led to Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Sublime’, in which the sublime is analysed 
as formlessness18 or as the gap in judgement, be it in its mathematical 
state of the infi nite or its dynamic state of pure forces without form. 
For our purposes, the younger Kant is of more use, since he drew, in 
particular, from the wealth of Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into 
the Origin of Our Ideas of the Beautiful and the Sublime of 1757 and 
started to change its organisation from a bipolar to a linear system.
Though in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sub-
lime (1764) Kant is not as imaginative as Burke in introducing new aes-
thetic values, he is highly original at conceiving linkages between them. 
While in Burke’s Enquiry all aesthetic examples are defi ned as subcat-
egories of the two polar categories, we encounter a more complex sys-
tematisation in Observations. As in Burke, we are told that mountains 
are sublime, as are Egyptian pyramids, and, in general, men more than 
women, but also black hair and all things related to the night, while 
small things are beautiful, and of course women more than men, as well 
as blond hair and delicate things bathing in daylight. The two colours 
of Plato’s horses return even in human hair, defi ning the same distinc-
tion of ecstatic Rührung and calming Reiz.19 As said, the increased sys-
temacy of the Observations is of more interest to us, especially since it 
is based on what Kant calls Mischung, admixture. We should bear in 
mind that ‘admixture’ is a concept closely related to Plato’s metaxu, 
since it requires a continuum between two different states. With the 
term Mischung, Kant is able to articulate the existence of objects that 
are, for instance, less sublime and more beautiful, such as the splendid, 
das Prächtige. That notion of the splendid is then no longer a subcat-
egory of the sublime, like Burke’s magnifi cence, but a genuine category 
born of the parentage of mixture. Because of its direct relation to power 
and overpowering, Kant found the splendid in palatial and ecclesiastical 
buildings. Homonyms for splendid are ‘superb’, ‘great’, ‘grand’, ‘mag-
nifi cent’, all referring unambiguously to size. Largeness is not merely a 
question of size; it necessarily follows the play of forces, and therefore 
structure is more visible than, say, a smooth skin. For example, Rome’s 
St Peter’s basilica, Kant argues, has both sublime aspects, because of 
the colossal order of ‘its frame, which is large and simple’,20 and ele-
ments of beauty, such as the ‘gold and the mosaic work’, and in their 
mixture we apprehend it as splendid. This is a discovery of great signifi -
cance, though mostly overlooked by Kant himself, since it means that an 
object that has aspects of two aesthetic categories can be experienced in 
one feeling rather than through swinging back and forth between two. 
Such an insight could have led him away from subjectivism, because it 
emphasises the singularity of the aesthetic object.
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At the far end of the sublime, Kant posits the Schreckhaft-Erhabene, 
the terrifying sublime, followed by the noble (das Edle), and then by 
the splendid. Each of these moves further away from a pure sublime, 
mixing in more beauty, until we fi nally arrive at beauty itself, fi rst in 
a more mature version, which still seems to contain some remnants of 
the sublime, and then in a juvenescent version he calls hübsch, pretty, a 
derivation of beauty that ‘speaks less to the heart’.21 As often, though, 
next to admixtures we fi nd Burkean subcategories of the sublime and 
of beauty, such as tragedy and comedy. Since in the Observations Kant 
is not trying to build a solid philosophical system, as he is in the three 
Critiques, it is rather diffi cult for the reader to distinguish between gen-
uine aesthetic feelings and variants of such feelings. Gradually, how-
ever, we see the beginnings of a linear system emerging, not Plato’s 
polar or Burke’s bipolar model, but a continuous line with at one end 
things that are smooth, vary gradually and are mostly smaller in size, 
and at the other end things that are rough, vary more through angular-
ity and sudden shifts and are larger. This resembles almost exactly the 
system used by Uvedale Price to position his notion of the picturesque 
as ‘a station between beauty and sublimity’.22 In 1796’s On the Pictur-
esque, he maps out exactly what the picturesque consists of:
Another essential quality of beauty is gradual variation; that is . . . where the 
lines do not vary in a sudden and broken manner, and where there is no sudden 
protuberance: it requires but little refl ection to perceive, that the exclusion of 
all but fl owing lines cannot promote variety; and that sudden protuberances, 
and lines that cross each other in a sudden and broken manner, are among the 
most fruitful causes of intricacy. I am therefore persuaded, that the two opposite 
qualities of roughness, and of sudden variation, joined to that of irregularity, 
are the most effi cient causes of the picturesque.23
Reading this carefully, we notice that Price describes the two not just 
as a pole of roughness and an opposing one of smoothness but also as 
two types of variation. Here, we get the fi rst hint in aesthetic theory 
that things are combinations (equations, mixtures, metaxu) of two slid-
ing scales, one of smooth and one of rough variation, one of graduality 
and one of suddenness. What fi rst seemed to be a mere pole of beauty 
opposed to one of the sublime slowly develops into an axis of beauty, 
sliding between unity and plurality, and an axis of the sublime, sliding 
between maximum depth, that is, the infi nite, and minimum depth, such 
as prettiness. This would mean that less smooth does not automatically 
equate to more rough but that both smoothness and roughness consist 
of their own sliding scales, each infl uencing every object independently. 
We fi nd another hint at such a theory in Hogarth’s renowned Analysis 
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of Beauty, which is generally taken as an argument for mere smooth-
ness, since it stipulates the importance of the smooth, S-shaped serpen-
tine line, which he calls the line of beauty. This is only partially correct, 
since in Hogarth’s analysis these lines of smoothness and gradualism do 
not connect up smoothly:
there is one type of waving line that truly deserves the name of the line of 
beauty, only one precise serpentine line that I call the line of grace . . . lines that 
should be judiciously mixed and combined with one another . . . into [a joint 
sensation of bulk and motion].24
Later in the book, when discussing contemporary women’s hairdos, 
he calls the combination of smooth curves and criss-crossing wanton-
ness ‘picturesque’,25 almost forty years before Uvedale Price used the 
term. And in his paintings and engravings he uses the same term for 
dancing groups, gatherings at dinner tables and crowds in the street. 
In his introduction to the book, Ronald Paulson very aptly describes 
Hogarth’s aesthetics as ‘an aesthetics of the crowd’.26 The title The 
Analysis of Beauty suggests the desire to update the notion of beauty, 
though, not to introduce a new species, and to move away from the 
all-too-idealised, all-out smoothness of Giorgione or Titian, in which 
smooth lines do connect up smoothly. Hogarth tried to locate a new 
middle in the combination of roughness – what he calls ‘bulk’ – and 
smoothness – ‘the line of grace’. In Price and Hogarth, we encounter 
as yet only a suggestion of a biaxiality of the aesthetic system; we must 
wait almost two hundred years to see it elaborated to its full extent in 
the realm of philosophy. 
In that discipline, it was fi rst Wilhelm Dilthey, the German neo-
Kantian philosopher, who expanded Kant’s selection of values, fi t-
ting in more of the terms that Burke had introduced. What makes 
his contribution particularly valuable is the introduction of the term 
‘spectrum’ in his discussion of the notion of mixtures. In 1887’s Poetry 
and Experience, he writes:
To this mixture of the sublime, the tragic, and evil, ugliness can be added. Here 
we reach the limits of aesthetic impression. We represented the beautiful as the 
midpoint of a spectrum of poetic moods.27
Of course, we have just leapfrogged over the span of a full century, 
so by the time we encounter Dilthey, many details have been added to 
what we can almost start calling the aesthetic diagram. Aside from the 
term ‘mixture’ reintroduced after Kant, we see that Dilthey has man-
aged to fi nally position ugliness in the line-up; until then, ugliness had 
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merely been a subcategory of beauty, and a negative one at that. The 
works of Victor Hugo, Dickens or Shakespeare would be unimaginable 
without their ugly characters, Dilthey argues; the narrative would sim-
ply not move forward. And he encounters the same positivity of the 
ugly in African masks and in Dante. To clarify, he is not making a 
judgement; neither judgement nor criticality plays an ontological role 
in aesthetics. Following the same line of argument, Charles Hartshorne 
states very clearly that there is no negativity in aesthetics, not even a 
zero, only positivity:28 there is no way we cannot experience; we might 
qualify our experience as ‘negative’, but that is still a qualifi cation and 
not a non-qualifi cation. What is more, Dilthey speaks of a spectrum of 
values, which will prove to be important when we start to involve the 
colour wheel as a system incorporating not only gradualism but also 
contrast and suddenness. And, he makes a far bigger effort than his pre-
decessors to restore the notion of beauty-as-the-middle, repositioning it 
from one side of the spectrum to the centre:
On both ends of the spectrum, whose middle is formed by the ideally beautiful, 
there arises an admixture of displeasure, and from a dissolution of the latter, a 
peculiar agreeableness. In one case, the feeling of something immeasurably great 
in the meaning of an object must be overcome; in the other case, the feeling of 
something trifl ing.29 
He is on to something extraordinary here. After hundreds of years of 
aestheticians extending the range of the sublime, adding various types 
of terror, even of horror (in the case of Ann Radcliffe),30 he extends the 
range of beauty, not just with prettiness but many other aesthetic val-
ues, at least enough to shift beauty towards the middle. Though much 
of Kant remains in his analysis, Dilthey succeeds in including many of 
the values that Burke listed in his Enquiry, such as the ugly, the tragic 
and the comic, as Kant had failed to do. As with his predecessors, it 
is often diffi cult to precisely distinguish between categories and sub-
categories, but shifting back and forth, we can retrieve the following 
spectral sequence from Poetry and Experience: moving from one end to 
the other, we encounter the sublime, the tragic, the ugly, the beautiful, 
the sentimental, the comical, the graceful and the petite. At this point it 
is irrelevant whether or not we agree with this list. We merely need to 
acknowledge that what we called ‘minimum depth’ a few paragraphs 
ago has now been extended by multiple values, with petite at the far 
end, in clear reference to the smallest possible size of things. ‘Trifl ing’ 
also denotes a certain shallowness or superfi ciality, directly position-
ing it on an axis of depth, even though it indicates a lack of it. On the 
other hand, a spectrum of depths does not fi t with Hutcheson’s smooth 
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spectrum that went from unity to variety, with everything in between 
and beauty in the middle. Evidently, organising aesthetic values in a 
linear system presents serious limitations. For instance, we can see how 
the sublime might differ only one notch from the tragic, but to have the 
ugly removed likewise by a single notch from beauty seems improb-
able. The more existing aesthetic values we try to incorporate, the less 
a single dimension succeeds in explaining how middles and extremes 
are to be related. If everything is mixture, what is at the ends? Surely, 
if there are ends, they would be excluded from the mixture. But if we 
succeeded in removing the ends, where would that leave the middle? 
That said, the enormous contribution of Dilthey’s spectrum lies in the 
inclusion of the ugly as a positive value and (re-)positioning beauty in 
the middle of the system.
Finally, in his Aesthetics and the Theory of Art of 1906, the German 
aesthetics theorist Max Dessoir turns the spectrum into a circle. A two-
dimensional circle is capable of organising values in a way that the 
one-dimensional line of a spectrum cannot; it can include adjacent gra-
dations, such as that between the sublime and tragic, as well as contrast-
ing oppositions, such as that between beauty and ugliness. In Dessoir’s 
book it is depicted in a very small diagram, no more than an inch in 
diameter, with six aesthetic categories aligned along the perimeter. The 
spectral line born out of Burke’s bipolar system now becomes an aes-
thetic circle that runs from sublime to beautiful, to cute (Niedlich),31 to 
comic, to ugly, and fi nally to tragic, which links up again with the sub-
lime. Without going too far with our analysis, we should make a few 
remarks on Dessoir’s terminology. In the fi rst place, ‘cute’ is a far better 
term than Kant’s ‘pretty’ or Dilthey’s ‘petite’. ‘Pretty’ is not shallow 
enough, and ‘petite’ not small enough, to occupy the position most con-
trary to the sublime. For instance, babies are cute, and for good reason: 
cuteness is the form beauty takes in situations where there is a complete 
lack of power, so as to restore that power. Cuteness merges the shallow 
and the likeable into an overwhelming sweetness – again, a category 
acknowledged by Burke32 – which we recognise from our soft drinks 
and our obsession with sugar, as well as from the way lovers constantly 
address one another as ‘Sugar’, ‘Sweetie’ or ‘Honey’. Cuteness plays a 
far more important role in our contemporary aesthetic than it did in 
Dessoir’s time, when there was no Hello Kitty, no My Little Pony, no 
Mini or Swatch (Figure 8.1). 
On the other hand, when we compare Dessoir’s circle to Dilthey’s 
spectrum, some terms are missing, and some of the positionings are 
rather unconvincing. For instance, it is diffi cult to imagine the sublime 
and the beautiful as being adjacent to one another in the same way that 
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beauty and the cute are, nor akin in the way of the sublime and the 
tragic, whose link was thoroughly established by Schiller and Schelling. 
Nor can we imagine the sublime and the beautiful being as close as the 
ugly and the comic, though Dessoir’s positioning of the ugly is again 
an enormous improvement on Dilthey’s. The comic and the ugly have 
an intimate relationship that we recognise from a long history, starting 
with dwarves, hunchbacks and jesters in the European courts, hilari-
ous and pitiful Falstaffs in the theatre, and the dumme August and 
stumbling clowns in the circus. Similarly, from the eighteenth century 
onwards, we witnessed the explosion of caricature, the ultimate science 
of elasticity – elongating noses, thickening lips, bulging eyes, widening 
heads, shrinking chins and so on – which culminates in our own fabu-
lous Mr Bean, who is blessed with the most elastic face ever. As with 
Dilthey, we are for the moment only concentrating on the organisa-
tional geometry of the aesthetic system, and therefore we can overlook 
the misplacing of certain categories and the resulting sequential order. 
Crucial at this point is that Dessoir closes the linear sequence into a 
circle by merging the ends, creating a continuity of aesthetic values. 
It is no accident that the circular system looks like a colour wheel, as 
Dessoir himself remarks: ‘the whole fabric of aesthetic feelings can take 
on various tints. . .’33 Probably he chose six tints34 for his aesthetic circle 
because it resembled Goethe’s colour wheel of 1809 (see Figure 8.2, left), 
who, unlike Newton, based his colour scheme on gradations as much 
as on opposites (or what Goethe called polarity). The English edition 
of Dessoir’s book adds spokes to the circular diagram, making it look 
Figure 8.1 The aesthetic spectrum as published by Max Dessoir. On the left is the 
original German version from his 1906 Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft; 
on the right, the diagram as published in the 1970 English edition Aesthetics and the 
Theory of Art (which mistranslates Niedlich as ‘pretty’ instead of ‘cute’). 
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even more like a wheel. Dessoir, who explicitly mentions Dilthey’s Poetry 
and Experience as the main source of his ideas, admirably managed to 
join the two ends of the spectrum, like the ouroboros biting its own tail. 
Above all, he writes, his goal was ‘to arrange the primary forms in such 
a way that the transition from each to the two adjacent ones occurs with 
conceptual ease, and those opposed in content are opposite in position’.35 
Again, it is an order that explains the two dimensions of existence in a 
way that a straight spectral band cannot. We can read the circle rotation-
ally, following the gradual change from beautiful to cute to comic to 
ugly, and we can read beauty as opposite to ugliness as well, since they 
are positioned directly across the centre of the circle from each other. It 
coincides exactly with the colour wheel, which we can read as a system 
that contains smooth, gradual variations, such as that between red and 
orange, as well as rough, complementary contrasts, such as that between 
red and green.
In the history of colour theory, the circular diagram actually pre-
ceded the linear spectrum, since the latter is based on wavelengths in 
the electromagnetic realm that were not established until the nineteenth 
century. When we look back at the colour wheel with the knowledge of 
electromagnetic waves, we should ask ourselves how it is possible that 
ultraviolet can occupy a position directly adjacent to infrared when 
the two are at opposite ends of the linear spectrum. The position of 
violet between blue and red is completely logical when we look at the 
colour wheel, but not when we look at the linear band of colours of 
Figure 8.2 The two most famous colour wheels: on the left, Goethe’s 1809 version 
with six colours (containing the term Schön in the red area); on the right, Newton’s 
version from Opticks (1704).
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the electromagnetic spectrum.36 It is quite a mystery, and in the world 
of colour theory there is no real answer to be found; it appears that 
colour is a system in itself, independent of electromagnetic waves, and 
therefore necessarily takes on the shape of a closed circle. How else can 
the colour corresponding to a wavelength of 380nm (violet) fi t next 
to the one corresponding to that of 720nm (red)? What is discontinu-
ous in the linear spectrum is continuous on the colour wheel, solving 
all relations between colours as gradations, but without sacrifi cing the 
structuring oppositions. Circular colour diagrams date back to medi-
eval times, and though Aron Sigfrid Forsius made one in 1611 that 
contained much more detail, none of these exhibit the simplicity of 
Newton’s colour circle published in his 1704 Opticks (see Figure 8.2, 
right). It is not certain that Newton ever laid eyes on the diagram of 
Forsius, nor how he came to bend the linear spectrum created by prism 
and rainbow alike into a circle. One reason why Newton created his 
circular diagram could be that he conceived it as a disc. With all the 
colours – and in his mind there were seven, which deeply disturbed 
Goethe, who preferred six – painted in the right sizes, the disc, when 
spun around at high speed, would change from multicoloured to white. 
(There we are: white is the mixture of all mixtures, the middle of all 
mediation.) This was to prove his theory that white light could be bro-
ken into spectral colours by a prism. However, it doesn’t explain the 
colours’ order. Probably the fi nal answer was given by Newton himself, 
who admitted that between red and blue we would see indigo, not just 
the violet we fi nd in the prismatic range.37 None of these explanations 
is very satisfying. The perplexing fact remains that all colours can be 
arranged on a wheel, a solution far more convincing than the linear 
electromagnetic spectrum: it radically turns colour into a world of its 
own, an autonomous system constructed by internal relations of grada-
tion and opposition. 
The fact that we cannot explain something with concepts that are 
external to it means that, philosophically speaking, we have reached 
bedrock. A system that only consists of smooth, gradual variations 
would need an underlying, second system to adequately explain con-
trasts. And a system that consists only of fractures or rough variations 
would need a secondary system to explain kinship. It is mind-boggling 
to discover an ontological machinery based on continuity explaining the 
discontinuous, since it acknowledges polarity without having to rely on 
negativity. Nothing precedes colour; no other systems are a priori to it: 
there is only the parallelism of other value systems, such as aesthetics, 
taste, smell and feeling, but no deeper ontology. What we generally view 
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as mere peripheral, surface phenomena are actually structured in them-
selves, and therefore absolutely fundamental. Facts are made of value 
systems, or, as Whitehead put it: ‘an actual fact is a fact of aesthetic 
experience’.38 This not only means that colour follows the structure of 
being but, more shockingly, the reverse as well, potentially creating a 
massive leak between aesthetics and ontology. In a nutshell: objects are 
constructed in the same system that we use to have feelings for those 
objects. And so subjectivism is the fi rst to leave the scene, followed by 
negation, and then materialism – matter is simply what matters. 
Compass and Wheel
Before we move to the fi nal stage in the development of a biaxial 
systemacy, in the form of Charles Hartshorne’s Diagram of Aesthetic 
Values, we should take a brief look at the ideas on beauty of his 
primary infl uence, the Anglo-American philosopher Alfred North 
Whitehead. Like Hartshorne, Whitehead developed his ideas on 
beauty quite late in life, and not really until two of his last books, 
Adventures of Ideas (1933) and Modes of Thought (1938), published 
when he was in his seventies. 
As I have discussed on earlier occasions,39 to defi ne the nature of the 
two axes properly it is vital to understand Whitehead’s argument, espe-
cially considering the history of aesthetic theories, which, by the way, 
both he and Hartshorne felt confi dent enough to omit. Beauty – ‘the 
teleology of the universe’, as Whitehead phrased it40 – consists of two 
dimensions, one of ‘mutual adaptation’, the other of ‘patterned con-
trasts’,41 or, in the words of Price, Hogarth and Burke, one dimension 
of smoothness and one of roughness. The axis of mutual adaptation 
(note the phrase’s subtle evolutionary and environmental ring) indexes 
the necessity of harmonising, that is, wholes harmonising with other 
wholes; in short, the synthetic axis of smoothness, or extensity. The 
fact that it consists of an axis means that on the one end we fi nd things 
that harmonise extremely, that are ultra-unifi ed, which Whitehead calls 
‘minor beauty’ or ‘the absence of a painful clash’.42 Meanwhile, on 
the other end, we fi nd things that don’t succeed in harmonising, that 
is, things that are ultra-plurifi ed, what we call ugly. It is important to 
understand that the other term, contrast, is different from mere diver-
sity, though. Things do not simply vary, they break away from each 
other. We see fractures emerging, sudden shifts and cuts (being literally 
analytic). Such contrasts and fractures often lead to layering and strati-
fi cation, with parts or groups of parts hiding behind one another, in 
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what we often denote with ‘depth’ or ‘profundity’. Therefore, the effect 
of contrast is often expressed by magnitude, which is why we fi nd the 
previously discussed greatness of the sublime on this axis, as well as the 
smallness of the cute at its opposite end.
This system allows every thing, every ‘occasion’, every gesture to 
exist as a combination of smoothness and roughness, or in Whitehead’s 
terms, massiveness and intensity. Here, massiveness refers to an index 
of coordination by gradual variation, and intensity to an index of the 
degree to which that coordinated whole allows its parts to be avail-
able to others. In themselves, there is nothing new in these remarks; 
we fi nd them as readily in Uvedale Price or Edmund Burke. What is 
remarkable, however, is the fact that Whitehead does not put these on a 
single sliding scale, with massive, compact wholes at one end and loose, 
fractured ones at the other. Whitehead’s doctrine is not just another 
take on Hutcheson’s unity amid variety. The parameters of massiveness 
and of intensity each have a uniform side and a diverse side; both are 
driven by variation, but each by a different type: one smooth, the other 
rough; one operating on adaptation, the other on contrast.43 Though 
he does not refer to prior aesthetic theories, which would have been 
helpful, nor visualise his system in the form of a diagram, which would 
have been even more helpful, he clearly views the system as a two-
dimensional one, organised along two axes, each with minimum and 
maximum values at the ends.
Eventually, by combining Whitehead’s ideas on beauty with Des-
soir’s little diagram, Hartshorne took the fi nal steps in his development 
of a diagram of aesthetics, an effort which can be traced over many 
years, beginning in the 1970s with Creative Synthesis and Philosophic 
Method, where he published the fi rst version of what he then called 
the Dessoir-Davis Circle. As a diagram, it was strongly infl uenced by 
Dessoir’s example from the beginning of the century, but the philoso-
phy behind it owes far more to Whitehead. The version Hartshorne 
published in Creative Synthesis was a still-crude version of what he 
later, in 1987’s Wisdom as Moderation, fi nalised as the ‘Diagram of 
Aesthetic Values’ (see Figure 8.3). In these diagrams, Hartshorne made 
two essential adjustments to Dessoir’s model, based on his readings 
of Whitehead: fi rst, he repositioned beauty, and second, he added the 
superb,44 the neat and the commonplace.45 
We should look at the repositioning of beauty fi rst. It is quite clear 
that Whitehead’s notion of beauty lies at the core of his process phi-
losophy: things are only beautiful in their striving for beauty. Beauty 
is, above all, a teleological concept, since, as Whitehead himself said, 
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‘adaptation implies an end’,46 and while things strive to harmonise they 
can only do so by freeing their parts, allowing them to break away. 
Beauty, then, is not simply a state but a vector, similar to Apollo’s arrow 
at the beginning of our discussion: each extensive act carries the need 
for intensity. Beauty inherently lies at the centre of all this, as liter-
ally the target of every arrow, merging target with trajectory. It lies 
where the two axes intersect, and not where Dessoir located it, at the 
rim. Even though Hartshorne was deeply infl uenced by Whitehead, to 
actually position beauty at the centre of a circle with two axes was a 
masterstroke.47 Thinking back to Plato’s white and black horses, we 
can see how Hartshorne’s model recasts the two forces as one striving 
for harmonisation and the other for intensity. In Hartshorne’s diagram, 
beauty is again fi rmly positioned in the middle, but the middle of a far 
more complex system that reconfi gures Plato’s monopolar, solar notion 
of beauty: ‘Beauty, in the most natural sense of the word, is the center, 
the double mean in both dimensions.’48 Beauty is not a simple, singular 
middle, but a middle trying to fi nd another middle.
Figure 8.3 Diagram of Aesthetic Values from Charles Hartshorne, Wisdom as 
Moderation (1987).
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Along with his Platonic repositioning of beauty, Hartshorne added 
three new categories to Dessoir’s six, one of which he called ‘superb’ 
– an idea we have already come across in Burke, in the form of mag-
nifi cence, as well as in Kant, in the form of the Prächtige – and the 
other two ‘neat’ and ‘commonplace’. The latter two are crucial addi-
tions: ‘neat’, though not a wholly satisfactory term, has connotations 
of monotony and boredom, while the commonplace corresponds to 
the normal or ordinary. With these, Hartshorne completely rearranges 
– repairs – the top half of Dessoir’s model. It can be no accident that 
these fi nal categories were added in the twentieth century, the age of the 
media and the masses. Before then, the concept of the commonplace 
was known mostly in the form of vulgarity, which at best ended up 
being associated with the comic. But in its modernist form, it points 
to a blandness and a complete lack of qualities that is truly original. 
The neat, better known in the form of boredom, is far older and, as 
ennui, was even considered an art by the likes of Charles Baudelaire 
and Beau Brummell (who famously turned to his valet to ask which 
of two lakes he admired most).49 Andy Warhol, the twentieth-century 
champion, if not patron saint, of boredom, made an eight-hour movie 
of the Empire State building fi lmed in real time over a single night, 
appropriately titled Empire. He also loved to spend his holidays in 
Sweden, because, as he said, ‘in a place like that you can get so bored’.50 
The closest category from ancient history would probably be the deca-
dence of the late Roman Empire as described in Petronius’s Satyricon. 
With Hartshorne’s circle, the aesthetic spectrum seems to transform 
into a continent, a planet even, where the spectral lines of Kant, Dilthey 
and Dessoir form partial routes or complete equators. Hartshorne’s 
addition of the neat and the commonplace created a ‘north passage’ at 
the top of the diagram similar to sixteenth-century attempts to expand 
shipping routes from Europe.
With Hartshorne’s Diagram of Aesthetic Values, we can fi nally go 
full circle: reading clockwise, we encounter the sublime, the superb, the 
neat, the commonplace, the pretty, the comic, the ugly, the tragic and 
fi nally the sublime again. We should make a few adjustments, however. 
The superb is not as convincing as magnifi cence; the latter has more 
historical roots that go deeper and wider than superb, which dates back 
no further than the Renaissance. The neat should be substituted by the 
boring; again, its history is just too powerful, as we saw above, to say 
nothing of the celebrated elaborations of Martin Heidegger and Erich 
Fromm on the topic. The other replacement should be for the pretty, 
which we should exchange for the cute, which is conceptually stronger, 
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and more correct opposite the sublime. Hartshorne seems unaware of 
Dilthey’s categorisation of ‘trifl ing’ coinciding with his own qualifi cation 
of the pretty as bordering on the ‘too trivial’, and how Kant’s notion of 
the Hübsch preceded these. Oddly enough, Hartshorne never discusses 
any historical precedents or developments of the circle or its terminol-
ogy. Therefore, the fi nal circular line-up will be: sublime, magnifi cent, 
boring, commonplace, cute, comic, ugly, tragic, and back to sublime. 
Although Hartshorne never bothered to draw the actual axes and only 
indicated the four poles in additional captions, we should include these 
in the revised diagram as well: a horizontal axis spanning from sublime 
on the left to cute on the right, and a vertical axis from ugly at the bottom 
to boring at the top (see Figure 8.4). Together they create the structure 
of a wheel or compass. It moves from the silent scream of the sublime 
to the exalted cry of the magnifi cent to the yawning mouth of boredom 
to the fl at expression of the commonplace to the gentle smile of the cute 
Figure 8.4 The compass of beauty (adapted from Hartshorne’s diagram to include 
the biaxial system and a revised terminology).
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to the outright laughter of the comic to the disgusted ‘ick’ of the ugly, 
on to the weeping of the tragic, and back to the noiseless gasp of the 
sublime. We could play these facial expressions as an animation and we 
wouldn’t be able to discern any jumps or cuts. And it all works because 
beauty has been taken out of the sequence: the relations between all 
these aesthetic values are wholly different than those between them and 
beauty. We have eight aesthetic categories that occur on the outer rim 
of aesthetics, connected by spokes of gradually decreasing value to the 
hub of beauty, which is in fact a ninth one, or the fi rst, whichever one 
prefers. That the system in its fi nal form looks like a compass refl ects 
both meanings of the word: a limited, fi nite structure such as a planet as 
well as an instrument for navigating that planet.
Translated back into the colour wheel, this would give us the stan-
dard hues at the outer edge of the circle, with more brightness mixed 
into each colour until it becomes pure white light in the middle. (Plato’s 
solar model of beauty was probably no accident.) Now we should also 
be able to fi nd a place for every nameable aesthetic value on this circle, 
since feelings can vary in all directions, both rotationally and radially. 
We should have no problem fi nding positions that are located neither at 
the centre or at the rim but occupy the as-yet-undefi ned area in between 
– the quirky, the quaint, the weird, the cool, the elegant, the vulgar, the 
melodramatic, the horrifi c, the gruesome, etc. – but that is an argument 
we will save for later.
When we fast-forward through the history of beauty, the fi rst pecu-
liarity that attracts our attention is that it started with Plato, who hated 
art, then developed through aesthetics, with indispensable contribu-
tions by artists, and then moved away from art again. For example, 
I think the Large Hadron Collider and the Saturn V rocket are more 
sublime than paintings of mountains, far more abstract and far more 
violent. And football stadiums are more magnifi cent than Kant’s St 
Peter’s, and when a wave performed by 80,000 spectators moves over 
the stands, we are overpowered and swept away – to use Longinus’s 
terms – by sheer awe. General Tommy Franks also called his invasion 
of Baghdad a strategy of ‘shock and awe’, leaving no misunderstanding 
about where we should locate the sublime in our own age. I think there 
is more terror and horror in the daily imagery of suicide bombings 
than in Alien, Friday the 13th and The Texas Chainsaw Massacre put 
together. There is more of the commonplace and the ordinary in real-
ity television, in the endless soap operas and in Facebook posts than in 
the street life of Baudelaire’s Paris. And if you type ‘beauty’ into your 
search engine, you won’t fi nd the work of contemporary artists but a 
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zillion websites related to the cosmetics industry. And who is not cute 
today (though no society goes as far as the Japanese with their kawaii)? 
It seems that art is playing an ever-smaller role – and the media an ever-
larger one – in the development of the diagram, and especially in how it 
organises the distribution of objects. Was Plato right again? Permit me 
to leave that as an open question. 
In any case, what becomes evident in the developments over the last 
fi fty years is that they show the ontological nature of the diagram more 
prominently. It is also clear from these developments that we seem to be 
living in an era that is expanding the diagram at high speed while mov-
ing away from its middle with equal speed. We live in an age of design: 
not just the design of objects but of events, concepts and issues, of 
organisations and procedures, even of our own lives. One’s own life has 
become a project. The number of things is growing exponentially, and 
growing exponentially further away from beauty. If the diagram con-
cerns all things, not just works of art, we should realise that it concerns 
them through beauty. This is the true power of Hartshorne’s Diagram 
of Aesthetic Values: only beauty can relate the vertical axis to the hori-
zontal one. The two axes are not independent; they don’t form a mere 
coordinate system. If they were independent, the diagram would not be 
a circle but a square, and we could simply combine one extreme with 
the other, which goes against the whole notion of a middle. A square 
is not an equation; a circle is. We should keep in mind that even the 
sublime in Hartshorne’s diagram is plotted halfway against the vertical 
axis of harmony and coordination. The fact that the infl uence of each 
axis always needs to be mediated makes beauty more than simply the 
middle of a circular world: it reverses the roles and makes the periph-
ery a derivative of the middle. Both areas are circles: a white one in the 
middle and a multicoloured one at the outskirts. 
I don’t have to stress the fact that Hartshorne’s diagram shares many 
traits with the cruciform structure of Heidegger’s fourfold; the similarities 
are quite obvious. They share the same purpose: to divide Being accord-
ing to two axes, one spanning the space between the unifi ed (boredom) 
and the plurifi ed (ugly), the other between the deep (sublime) and the 
shallow (cute).51 Of course, Heidegger does not defi ne the fourfold by the 
axes but by the four quadrants, which he identifi es as sky, mortals, gods 
and earth. This is telling in a way, because by defi ning the quadrants he 
makes it impossible to view the axes as productive. The fourfold remains 
a static architectural system, a Geviert, and though he sometimes specu-
lates about one quadrant mirroring the other, and even about a ‘round 
dance’,52 it never attains the status of an ontological machine equipped 
5852_Voyatzaki.indd   199 17/08/18   5:37 PM
200 lars spuybroek 
with dynamic sliders. Viewing the intersection of the axes as a hub, and 
identifying that with beauty, causes the compass to take on the character 
of a wheel more than a cross. Heidegger’s Being always takes an unmov-
ing, neutral position, humming in the background, whereas Whitehead’s 
and Hartshorne’s beauty thrusts things forward into presence. From the 
perspective of the Diagram of Aesthetic Values, the four quadrants can 
never be primary because they are parented by two axes. All activity lies 
with the axes, and they are bound to one another, limiting each other’s 
infl uence to a circular fi eld of existence – what I earlier called the arena of 
presence. Heidegger strongly resented the notion of Being as presence53 
and attempted to extend the phenomenal world to absence (for example, 
the negativity of nothingness and the invisibility of Zuhandenheit), to 
things happening without passing through consciousness. Certainly, no 
one would deny that things exist before they enter human consciousness, 
but that does not mean that reality condemns things to roam around in 
darkness. On the contrary, it means things can claim light and conscious-
ness in their own right: nonhuman thought and unseen light. Things 
think before we think them (how else could we understand things?), they 
are visible before we see them (how else would we see them?), and they 
affect their environment before we feel them (how else would we fi nd 
them beautiful?). Again, the way the existence of things is constructed 
cannot be fundamentally different from the structure of our feelings; this 
is what the Diagram of Aesthetic Values teaches us.54 
When we take a careful look at the diagram, we can better see how 
process and product not only are combined but are combined symmet-
rically only in the middle and asymmetrically everywhere else (though 
still equated). When we go back again to stand in front of St Peter’s 
with our faces upturned and our mouths open in admiration, it is the 
magnifi cent structure that overwhelms us. If we move from the basili-
ca’s position of magnifi cence vertically down on Hartshorne’s map, we 
encounter fi gures such as Macbeth and Michael Jackson, obliterated by 
the tragic events they have instigated. At the position of magnifi cence, 
it is the massive structure that overwhelms us, and at the position of 
the tragic, it is the enormity of the events overwhelming their subjects: 
exactly the same magnitude in very different dimensions. This is why 
we recognise the top area of the diagram – the realm of magnifi cence, 
boredom and the commonplace – as the general territory of structures, 
or what Mikel Dufrenne called the spatial arts, and the bottom area – 
the realm of the tragic, the ugly and the comic – as the zone of events, 
or again in terms of aesthetics, the temporal arts.55 That doesn’t mean 
buildings ‘are’ boring; it means that when time is stopped they become 
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boring, as in Warhol’s Empire, where the Empire State building is bor-
ing because you are trapped in your seat. (If you are walking in New 
York, the Empire State building is anything but boring.) Or think of 
the funny example of Heidegger stuck in a provincial railway station 
after missing a train.56 Forced to wait for four hours, he started walk-
ing up and down the platform like a pendulum, hopelessly trying to 
restore time, like a panther in a cage. Inversely, the asymmetry of space 
and time means that the positivity of ugliness functions very well in 
plays, literature and movies but not in architecture. While in a gangster 
movie a character like Al Capone boosts the speed of events by bashing 
in heads with a baseball bat, an ugly building does not have the same 
positive effect on urban space. That doesn’t mean a building cannot 
be ugly; obviously it can, and a play can as easily be boring – that is 
not my point. In the specifi c case of a boring play, I think it exposes 
too much architecture, for example when it lacks development and has 
cardboard characters who move through the drama without changing. 
Similarly, a building is ugly when it tries to be funny or becomes too 
theatrical, since the chances are that we will encounter it more than 
once, killing all possible humour, or that we will experience it from 
more than one angle, destroying every illusion. 
On the product side, things have to be looked at in terms of how 
they relate to time; from the process side, they have to be looked at 
in terms of how they relate to space. Beauty is not organised by going 
from product to product nor from process to process, but from pro-
cess to product and from product to process and back again. Ours is 
a jerking, jolting universe. If aesthetics operated within one dimen-
sion, a single line of variations and gradations would suffi ce. If it con-
sisted merely of spatial encounters, things would simply shape each 
other from the outside and the synthetic axis would do all the neces-
sary work. And if it solely consisted of events meeting one another, 
all would be pure development; the internal growth of things would 
never lead to them being born into the world. In the Diagram of Aes-
thetic Values, these two lines are bound to one another as axes, with 
both rather than one or the other exerting their infl uence on the fi nal 
product. When things are formed, they are internally driven by a force 
occupying the analytic axis of intensity, while they simultaneously ori-
ent themselves in and adapt to an external world whose powers are 
expressed along the synthetic axis of the extensive, that is, present 
themselves as forms. Things present themselves in one realm, but they 
cannot be explained through one dimension, only through the confl a-
tion of two dimensions. 
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Stand in front of a 400-year-old oak tree. Its structure – the branch-
ings, the bifurcations, the random curvature – all this is pure process, 
pure time and growth. But does it present itself to us as time? Do we 
experience it as time? No, we experience it as sheer magnifi cence. All 
that was time is presented to us as beauty, and all that is beauty we 
experience in time, yes, but the second stretch of time is wholly discon-
tinuous with the fi rst. In this sense, beauty is purely Platonic, atemporal 
stoppage.
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